The English courts strictly enforce contractually agreed time limits to challenge a US$ 324 million award

In Eronat v CNPC & Cliveden, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision that the term “rendered” in the arbitration clause referred to the date the award was made, not when it was received by the parties. The effect of the decision was the dismissal of Mr Eronat's appeal under section 69 for being too late and the Court of Appeal confirmed that result.

Background

The dispute arose from a 2003 Deed of Indemnity between Mr Friedhelm Eronat, CNPC, Cliveden and CITIC Energy. CNPC and Cliveden sought indemnification from Mr Eronat after settling a claim with a third party (Carlton) for USD 324 million. The Deed of Indemnity contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the LCIA Rules with a seat being in England. The arbitral tribunal rendered an award on 11 April 2024 in favour of CNPC and Cliveden. The award was notified to the parties on 16 April 2024.

The arbitration clause allowed the parties to file an appeal against the arbitral tribunal's decision "provided that such appeal is brought thirty (30) days after the decision is rendered." On 16 May 2024 Mr Eronat filed the appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 ("1996 Act") i.e. 30 days after the award had been communicated to the parties by the LCIA but 35 days after the award was made by the Tribunal. 

Mr Justice Bryan refused permission to appeal under section 69 of the 1996 Act stating the time limit for filing the appeal ended on 11 May 2024, 30 days after the decision was made, rather than when it was communicated to the parties. He held that "rendered" referred to the date the award was made and not when it was received. Thus, the appeal was five days late. 

Mr Eronat disagreed with the court's interpretation of "rendered" and sought permission to appeal which Justice Bryan did not grant. Mr Eronat addressed the Court of Appeal directly. The Court of Appeal referred to the question whether it had the power to grant permission to appeal under section 69(8) of the 1996 Act but did not hear oral arguments on it. The Court of Appeal informed the parties at the conclusion of the hearing that, even on the assumption that the court had jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal, permission would be refused. 

Despite the Court of Appeal's implication not to have jurisdiction and even if it did, that it would not grant permission to appeal, the Court of Appeal set out its reasons why it considered Justice Bryan's decision to be correct: 

• The term "rendered" unambiguously referred to the making of the award, consistent with its use elsewhere in the arbitration clause.

• The LCIA Rules 1998, applicable at the time when the contract was made, support this interpretation.

• The ICC Rules, though not governing the arbitration, also distinguish between rendering and communicating an award – reinforcing common usage. 

• They rejected arguments of unfairness, noting only two working days were lost due to the delay in the communication of the award.

• Under the 1996 Act, appeal deadlines run from the date the award is made (which is 28 days under the Act), and no substantial injustice was shown to justify an extension.

Practical takeaways

This decision reinforces the importance of precise drafting in arbitration clauses. Courts will interpret terms like "rendered" in line with the established usage and will strictly enforce agreed time limits. "Rendered" means made, not communicated or received.